The Politics of Japanese Defense: Managing Internal and External Pressures by Joseph P. Keddell

Author:Joseph P. Keddell [Keddell, Joseph P.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781563241291
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 1993-07-31T00:00:00+00:00

Revision of the Ban on Arms Exports

The rise of U.S.-Japan defense technology cooperation represented a significant shift in bilateral securrty relations. For most of the postwar era the United States was concerned primarily with the operation of its bases in Japan for commitments elsewhere. Little consideration was given in either country to the development of the SDF or to their interaction with U.S. forces. Cooperation in equipment and technology was essentially a one-way flow of U.S. military aid, sales, and manufacturing licenses to Japan.152

But by the late 1970s the United States had become more interested in a two-way flow, because it wanted to advance a general principle of burden-sharing and to gain access to Japanese technological advances in order to improve the U.S. defense industrial base.

U.S. interest in gaining access to Japanese defense-related technology challenged the Ban on Arms Exports. The Japanese government's efforts to ease arms export restrictions were a barometer of the importance attached to maintaining the U.S. securrty guarantee.

The bilateral consultations in 1975 that culminated in establishment of the November 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation provided a major impetus for bilateral defense technology cooperation. Interest in shoring up bilateral securrty ties through increasing the interoperabilrty of forces led the United States to emphasize greater coproduction of military equipment. Under the principle of burden-sharing, U.S. officials viewed coproduction of weapons systems such as F-15 interceptors and P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft as a quick means of modernizing Japan's sea and air defense capabilities.153

Increased coproduction of weapons systems occurred in the midst of progress in joint planning for contingencies, greater joint military exercises, and coordination of intelligence activities. Although coproduction first arose in the latter 1960s because U.S. military aid was cut off, such arrangements increased after the establishment of the guidelines in 1978.

Pressures from within Japan also existed for greater joint weapons development. For example, in February 1980 the Keidanren Defense Production Committee urged the National [Defense Council to approve joint development of Cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions. The Keidanren Defense Production Committee's request was based on concerns in the arms industry that Japan was lagging behind the United States and European nations in the development of such technologies.154

Pressures for promoting technology transfers led to establishment of the Systems and Technology Forum in 1980. Although a series of meetings took place between American and Japanese officials in 1980 and 1981, nothing happened right away, partly because MITI feared that any such change in Japan's arms export policy would allow U.S. corporations to use Japanese technologies in electronics, fiber optics and semiconductors for their commercial advantage.155 MITI's traditional warnings to business of the public relations difficulties of arms exports may also have played a role.156

But the primary reason for the Suzuki Cabinet's reluctance to ease aims export restrictions was fear of antagonizing the public and the opposition. The opposition parties resisted U.S. pressures and demanded that arms export restrictions be tightened. Their demands led to unanimous passage by both houses of the Diet in March 1981 of a resolution

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.